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MANSLAUGHTER BY MOTORISTS-
By JAMES J. RoBINsoN*
W HILE a motorist, D, is driving an automobile on a city street
or along a country highway, his car strikes another person,
X, either directly or by collision with the vehicle in which X is
riding, inflicting injuries from which X dies. Has D committed
a homicide? If so, has he committed a homicide which is criminal?
The guilt or the innocence of D, under the criminal law of
almost all of the states, of the federal government, and of Eng-
land, is to be determined by considering the facts of the case with
relation to five classifications of homicide which have been made
by the common law. By consideration of the cases possible under
the facts stated above it will be seen that the killing may be:
(I) an intended homicide,--case 1, murder; case 2, voluntary
manslaughter; or case 3, justifiable homicide; or (II) no homi-
cide,--case 4, killing by accident, not by D; or (III) an unin-
tended homicide,-case 5, excusable homicide by negligence; or
case 6, involuntary manslaughter. These six cases include the
classes of homicide at common law.'
Homicide, like manslaughter, by derivation as a word' and
historically as a legal term,3 means the killing of a man by a man.
In order for homicide to be committed, therefore, a human being
must do an act which causes the death of another human being.
The act must be one which is directly and immediately connected
with the death, and one but for which the person killed would not
have died.4 In the case stated, therefore, D has committed a
"See Chart, page 788.
*Professor of Law, Indiana ,University.
'Wharton, The Law of Homicide (3d ed. 1907) 1.2Oxford English Dictionary, (1928).
3Bracton, De Legibus et Corisuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 120b:
Et est homicidium hominis occisio ab homine facta.4Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (1877) 154.
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homicide if he has done an act which has resulted in the death of
X. If D has done such an act, the question then arises, is the
resulting homicide a crime? The answer, will be seen to depend
upon whether or not D did the act with a criminal intent. If so,
it is the distinguishing characteristics of that intent which will
determine whether the crime committed by D was murder, volun-
tary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter.
The guilt or the innocence of D, therefore, resolves itself into
the two questions which are fundamental in any inquiry under
the criminal law. First, with regard to the law-what physical
acts and what mental intents or attitudes, when combined, are
made crimes by the law which is applicable to the facts? Second,
under the facts of this case,-did D do one or more of the
physical acts, and did he have one or more of the mental intents
which are, when combined, made criminal by the law? In order
to answer these two fundamental questions, it is necessary first
to determine what is the meaning or the use of the word "act,"
and what is the meaning or the use of the words "criminal intent,"
when used in definitions and in adjudications of crime.
A. THE AcT.
The criminal law is concerned primarily with acts. Its defini-
tions of crimes and its adjudications of guilt begin with the act.
What is an act? So far as the criminal law at least is concerned,
the word "act" means a mentally self-directed physical movement
by a human being. There are, therefore, two parts of an act,
namely, the mental or psychological part, and the physical move-
ment perceivable to a greater or less extent by one or more of the
five senses. The act, in order to be an act, must originate in a
human mind functioning competently, and it must be directed by
that mind. The tree, the ship, the animal, the madman, the infant
child, the somnambulist,-none of these, as Bracton and other
legal writers clearly point out,5 although each is capable of physi-
cal movement, does an act having legal significance, for the reason
that mental self-direction does not exist in such cases.
The second division of the act, the physical movement, com-
monly consists, in part at least, of the movement of part or all of
the body. An act may be, therefore, one movement or a related
group of movements. Each bodily movement in the operation
5Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 136b;
I Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1874) 292; Mercier, Criminal Respon-
sibility (1926) 16, 56.
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of an automobile, for example, is an act, and the whole coordinated
movement and activity is, in common speech and understanding,
called the act of driving the car. The scope and parts of an act
are matters which arouse differences of opinion,' but it seems
clear that the physical movement part of an act, as dealt with in
criminal law, usually includes three aspects or phases: (1) where
the act begins-its origin; (2) what of the surrounding facts the
act includes-its circumstances; and (3) where the act ends-its
consequences. The criminal law must deal with acts not piece-
meal but as significant units. Driving an automobile, to continue
the example just given, therefore, must be dealt with as including
the initial movements, the circumstances and the consequences
which together constitute the driver's operation, by mind and
body, of the automobile.
The authoritative and final determination of the use and mean-
ing of the term act, and of the nature and extent of its two ele-
ments, does not rest with the writers on jurisprudence and the
psychologists. That determination depends, from time to time and
place to place, upon (1) what the law says the specific act element
of the crime shall be; and upon (2) what the people as jurors
and as citizens of general experience understand to be the proper
application, limits and meaning of the term "act," as specified by
the law, and as known to common speech and common experience.
Common law and statute may state as the specified act, usually by
verb or by infinitive, a simple act such as to sound a horn, or a
complex or composite act such as to drive an automobile. Or the
act penalized may be the killing of a human being by driving an
automobile in an unlawful manner. It then becomes the duty
of the judge and the juror to investigate the facts in hand and
to determine at the outset whether those facts show the mental
element and the physical movement which the lawmaker has
specified as the act, the basic part of a crime.
B. THE CRIMINAL INTENT.
An act is not a crime unless it is accompanied by a criminal
intent. This fundamental principle is sometimes stated in this
form: a crime is an act plus a criminal intent. 7 Criminal intent
6Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 54, 91; Cf. Restatement, Torts(1934) sec. 2; Salmond, Jurisprudence (8th ed. 1930) 381, 383; Stroud, Mens
Rea (1914) 2; Hales v. Petit, (1563) 1 Plowden 257; 1 Austin, Lectures
on Jurisprudence (1874) 290, 293.7A few offenses, of course, consist of a prohibited act alone, criminal
intent not being required. Some offenses, moreover, consist of an omissiorr
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in general is the intent of the human being who is doing the
act, to injure another human being by the act; or the intent to
do an act by which another human being is likely to be injured.
"A crime is not committed," says Bracton, "unless the intent
(voluntas) to injure exists."8
The criminal intent may be an intent to injure a certain per-
son,9 or it may be an intent simply to do acts "under circumstances
in which they will probably cause some harm which the law seeks
to prevent." 10 The test of the criminality of the intent of this latter
type is "the degree of danger shown by experience to attend that
act under those circumstances."'1  The offender himself, there-
fore, may not recognize the fact that his intent to do the act in
question is a criminal intent. It may therefore become necessary
for a judge and a jury to inform him that his intent to do the act
was a criminal intent, and that he is held criminally accountable
for the consequences of his act.12 The consequences may in fact
be abhorrent to him but that does not mean that he did not
intend them.13 Criminal intent, therefore, including as it does both
of the forms just described (full intent and imperfect intent), may
be defined as a man-injuring frame of mind. This definition or
description is a general one for homicides; and it often is supple-
mented by specific provisions of statutes.
The criminal intent is created or established by common law
or by statute. Since it distinguishes the crime of which it is a
part, it differs with each crime.
Criminal intent must not be confused with the mental self-
direction element of the act. Both are mental, but the mental
self-direction element of the act is mental viewed from the stand-
point of looking into the mind itself as a physical or physiological
mechanism; the criminal intent is mental viewed from the stand-
to act in the discharge of a prescribed legal duty, plus, probably in most
cases, a criminal intent. Whether or not such an omission is an act, or
whether such an offense is an exception to the general rule, is a question
which need not be considered here.
SBracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 136b:
Crimen non contrahitur nisi voluntas nocendi intercedat.9This intent is called "full intent" by Stroud, Mens Rea (1914) 6.
l0 Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 75. This intent is called "imper-
fect intention" by Stroud, Mens Rea (1914) 6. Bracton's type illustrations,
as quoted infra, note 82, show that he included imperfect or indirect intent
in his term voluntas, supra, note 8.
"Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 75.
12Compare the Roman law doctrine culpa lata, "non intellegere quod
omnes intellegunt." Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common
Law (1936) 198.
l"Stroud, Mens Rea (1914) 3.
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point of looking out from the mind as a source of social or anti-
social conduct. The term "voluntary" often is used ambiguously
to refer to both the mental self-direction element of the act and
also the mental social-attitude element of the crime. The result
of such confusion in a particular case often is that consideration
is given solely either to the act or to the criminal intent, to the
exclusion of the other element, as a part of the crime which is
under consideration. 14 For this reason, among others, it seems
best not to speak of a "voluntary" act, but to restrict the use of
the term "voluntary" to the criminal intent to which it properly
belongs by derivation and by legal history.
Criminal intent must be kept distinct also from malice, and
from motive. Malice sometimes means criminal intent, but in
common speech at least it goes beyond intent. 5 Motive is the
desire prompting a man's conduct. It is often important in proving
intention but it is distinct from intention. 6
Criminal intent is preferable, as a term, to mens rea, a term
often used to mean criminal intent. This preference exists partly
because there is a tendency in the courts to prefer the English
words, and partly because of the varying interpretations of the
term mens rea and of the Latin maxim of which it is a part."
In homicide cases, the criminal intent to kill a specific person
is a distinguishing element of the crimes of murder and of vol-
untary manslaughter; the criminal intent to do an act likely to re-
sult in bodily harm to anyone is the distinguishing element of
involuntary manslaughter. In each of the five type cases of actual
homicide which are under consideration, the act, namely a killing, is
the same act. Whether the crime in each type is murder, or vol-
untary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter depends, there-
fore, upon the criminal intent which the facts show to be present
in each case.
The six classifications into which the case of D may fall will
now be considered. Most of the cases of killing by automobile
drivers are, of course, cases of involuntary manslaughter. That
14This confusion, in English cases, has been observed also by R. M.
Jackson, in his article on Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offenses, (1936)
6 Camb. L. J. 83, 91; and by J. W. C. Turner, in his article on The Mental
Element in Crimes at Common Law, (1936) 6 Camb. L. J. 31, 37. And see
text, infra, at notes 75, 79, 80, 120, 121.
15Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 52.
'
6Stroud, Mens Rea (1914) 4.
"?For example, uses of the terms mens rea and actus reus with which
the writer and others are unable to agree are found in Stroud, Mens Rea
(1914) 7, and in Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law,
(1936) 6 Camb. L. J. 31, 37.
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type of homicide, therefore, will necessarily require the greatest
amount of attention in this article. Other types of homicide.
however, must be considered because (1) the case of D as stated
at the beginning of the article may include them, and (2) they
offer opportunities for comparative applications of many of the
principles which are controlling principles in the law of invol-
untary manslaughter.
This study of the law of involuntary manslaughter is based
upon its application in automobile cases because of the outstanding
importance today of the automobile traffic problem.' 8 The law of
involuntary manslaughter, however, is of equal importance in the
other phases of modern life in which one person, by his conduct,
may endanger the lives and safety of many others. The same
legal principles are applicable, of course, in the operation of rail-
road trains, ships and airplanes, coal mines and various industrial
and building enterprises.
The principles of the law which are considered in the six cases
will be drawn from the common law, the statutes and the court




D drives an automobile against X, who is riding a bicycle
on the highway, nith intent to kill X, who dies of the injuries so
inflicted. 9
The question to be determined upon these facts is whether or
not D may be convicted of murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. This definition is the long-established definition of
the common law,20 and it is likewise the present definition of the
'
8In 1937, deaths arising from motor vehicle traffic accidents in the
United States numbered 39,700; permanently disabled, 110,000. Occupational
accident deaths, 19,000. The totals represented increases over the preceding
year. Statistical Bureau, National Safety Council. For England the annual
number of deaths in traffic accidents is set at 6,900. Griffith, Homicide on
the King's Highway, (1937) 121 Nineteenth Century 522.
19The facts stated are the facts of the case of Rex v. Mortimer, (1936)
25 Crim. App. Rep. 150, 80 Sol. J. 227. The conviction of murder, with
sentence of death, was affirmed. The case is noted in (1937) 6 Camb.
L. J. 246.
201 Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1678) 449.
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offense of murder as stated in modern statutes, such as the United
States Code.2
In making the application of the law defining the offense to
the facts of the case stated, what does the government have to
prove in order to convict D of the offense of murder? The govern-
ment must prove first, that D did the act specified by the statute
and second, that D had the criminal intent specified by the
statute.
The act element of the crime, as defined at common law and
by statute, is the killing of a person. The government must prove
(1) that D killed X. In order to establish this fact, it will be
necessary to be ready to prove, (a) that D's physical movements,
as such, were under adequate mental self-direction, and (b) that
D actually made one or more of a related group of physical move-
ments leading to the death of X. In regard to (a), under the
facts stated the evidence indicates, in the absence of any question
to the contrary, that D's act was competently self-directed, so far
as adequate mental control by D of his own physical movements
was concerned. In regard to (b), namely, the physical move-
ment element of the act, the facts stated show the following series
of significant events which, at the time of the injury to X, made
up this part of the act. The origin of the act consisted in D
guiding his car toward the person riding the bicycle. The signifi-
cant circumstances include the circumstances surrounding the
collision of the automobile with the bicycle and its rider. The
consequence was the resulting death of X. The act of homicide
is established by the facts stated.
The criminal intent element of the crime of murder is malice
aforethought. Malice aforethought is the intent of one human
being to injure a certain other human being to the extent of
taking, or of endangering, his life, without legal justification,
excuse or mitigation.2 2 In view of the fact that this intent is
directed against the life and safety of a specific human being, it
is called "full" intent. It is because of the extreme culpability of
this type of criminal intent, without mitigation, that murder always
has been and now is punishable generally by death.
In order to prove that D committed the crime of murder the
government must prove, (2) that D at the time of his act had the
21Criminal Code of the United States, sec. 273. 18 U. S. C. A. sec.
452, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 452.
22Cf. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, (1934) 43
Yale L. J. 537.
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criminal intent which is specified by the legal definition of the
crime of murder, namely malice aforethought. The facts stated
show that D. with full and direct intent to kill X, drove the auto-
mobile against X and thereby inflicted the fatal injuries. The
facts, moreover, fail to show any ground of justification, excuse,
or mitigation. The criminal intent of malice aforethought is
therefore established by the facts.
Since the act of killing and the kind of criminal intent required
for murder were both proved as the facts of the case, D was prop-
erly convicted of murder.
23
CASE 2. VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
The facts:
While D is driving an automobile, X throws a rock through the
weindshield. The rock and broken glass cut D's face and hands.
D, enraged, drives the car against X, who dies of the injuries so
inflicted.
The question to be determined upon the facts stated is whether
or not D may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being with-
out malice. This is the definition of the common law, as stated
by Hale and Blackstone. It is also the definition stated in modern
codes.2 4
The term manslaughter, which is of Anglo-Saxon origin, and
its Latin equivalent, homicide, were originally generic terms which
included all forms of felonious homicide. By 1340 the worst
kinds of homicide had come, in common usage, to be called murder.
Between 1496 and 1547 a series of statutes established murder as
the crime of killing "with malice aforethought." From this time on
the crime of murder is separated definitely from other classes of
homicide, and its history is mainly one concerning the interpreta-
tion of the term malice aforethought."
The term manslaughter was not immediately applied solely to
that form of homicide which was done without malice aforethought.
23Another conviction of murder committed by automobile is People v.
Brown, (1921) 53 Cal. App. 664, 200 Pac. 727. In this case the defendant
in order to avoid arrest by an immigration officer at the Mexican border
ran down and killed the officer. The case of State v. Peterson, (N.C.
1938) 194 S. E. 498, is probably the most recent of the few American
cases in which a conviction of a drunken driver for second-degree murder
has been affirmed. See (1936) 9 So. Cal. L. Rev. 145.24Criminal Code of the United States, sec. 274, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 453,
Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 453.
2-3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 40, 45.
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It persisted in England as the general term for felonious killing
through the sixteenth century,26 and it was in use in that sense in
the American colonies in the seventeenth century.
27
The division of manslaughter into the two classes, voluntary
and involuntary, is discussed later under Case 6.
In the offense of voluntary manslaughter, as in murder, the
act specified is a killing of a human being. In voluntary man-
slaughter, as in murder, the criminal intent is a full intent without
legal justification or excuse, to injure a certain other human be-
ing to the extent of taking, or of endangering, his life. The
difference, however, between the two crimes is that the criminal
intent in voluntary manslaughter is considered to be reduced in
its criminal character by some legally recognized provocation.
In the case stated above, the facts given are that D was so
angered by the wounds inflicted on him by X that he killed X
in the "heat of passion." With a full, though mitigated criminal
intent, and a killing of X both proved, D was properly convicted
of voluntary manslaughter.
CASE 3. JUSTIFIABLE HoMICIDE.
The facts:
While D is driving an automobile, X begins shooting at him.
D, in reasonable defense of his own life and safety, drives the car
against X, who dies of the injuries so inflicted.
This case requires slight consideration, because it has no special
bearing on principles involved in the law of involuntary man-
slaughter, the principal subject of this article. The case is included,
however, for the sake of completeness in the consideration of homi-
cide, and because of the fact that self-defense is such a common,
or one may say, popular, defense in homicide cases. The law of
justifiable homicide has an interesting history, especially in its
relationship to excusable homicide.2 s In the case stated, if D
should be indicted for the murder or for the manslaughter of
X, D would have a good defense in that he killed X in self-
defense. Although D did the act of killing X, and although D
had the intent to kill X, if necessary, the intent was not a criminal
263 Holdsworth, History of English Law (4th ed. 1935) 314.27The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1648) Capital Lawes,
p. 5.
28Wharton, The Law of Homicide, (3d ed. 1907) 9. Wharton classes
homicide se defendendo with homicide per infortunium as excusable homicide.
Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th ed. 1936) 117, however, classes it
as justifiable homicide.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
intent. His mental attitude was not primarily a man-injuring
frame of mind; his controlling intent was to save the life of a
human being, namely himself, under the necessity of the moment.
In killing X he is considered, moreover, to have served the ends
of criminal law by preventing the commission by X of a felony
dangerous to life.
II. No HoMxICIDE
CASE 4. KILLING BY ACCIDENT.
The facts :
While D is driving an automobile,
(1) X, in order to commit suicide, throws himself under the wheels
of D's car, and thereby suffers injuries from which X dies; or
(2) X, a child at play, runs against D's car and thereby suffers
injuries front which X dies; or
(3) D's automobile sustains a broken steering gear, and, without
past or present fault of D, the car goes out of control and
strikes X, who thereby suffers injuries from which X dies: or
(4) M, another motorist, drives his car against D's car, thereby
crowding or throwing D's car, without act or fault of D.
against X, who thereby suffers injuries from which X dies.
The question in each of these four situations under Case 4 is
whether or not D may be convicted, upon the facts stated, of any
crime based on homicide.
A definition of accidental killing which may, in these cases,
be applied in a manner comparable to the application of the defini-
tions of the crimes based on homicide, is not provided by the com-
mon law or by statute. Fundamental general principles of the
common law, however, may be applied and are adequate for decid-
ing the questions raised. The rule which is decisive of the ques-
tions is the rule that there is no crime unless there is both an act
and a criminal intent.
Did D, in any one of the four situations given above, do any
act which had as one of its parts or consequences the death of X ?
Applying to the facts stated our analysis of an act, we first observe
that D, at the time of the fatal injuries to X in each situation, was
presumably capable of mental self-direction in whatever physical
movement he might make. It is clear, moreover, that he was
engaged likewise in the physical movement part of the act of
driving the car. But, on the facts. the legal consequences included
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in that physical movement did not extend to and include the death
of X. The death of X was the result of the intervention of acts
of human agencies other than D, or of non-human agencies
not directed by D. In other words, so far as D was con-
cerned, there was no act-no homicide, in the strict sense of
the Bracton definition- 9 in any of the four situations. The
death of X, under each hypothesis, was, as to D, a "pure" or true
accident, that is, an experience which "fell to" the lot of D with-
out active participation by him in bringing it about. It must be
answered, therefore, that D did no act of which the death of X
was a legal consequence.
A crime, as stated above, is an act plus a criminal intent. In
cases where no act has been committed by the defendant, there can
be no crime proved against him. To proceed to inquire about the
existence and nature, in the pending case, of the other element
of crime, namely the criminal intent, is immaterial and sometimes
misleading; to say the least, it assumes, erroneously, that the de-
fendant has done the act.
In an opinion delivered last year in the House of Lords in the
case of Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions,0 there is an
illustration of what seems, with due respect, to be an ignoring
of the principle that where there is no act there is no question of
criminal intent. The question at issue was the nature of the
criminal intent required for involuntary manslaughter in auto-
mobile cases, and the failure to apply the principle just stated has
contributed to the adverse criticism which the decision has aroused
in England.3 '
"It is perfectly possible," said Lord Atkin in the Andrews Case,
"that a man may drive at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the
public and cause death and yet not be guilty of manslaughter....
As an instance... a man might execute the dangerous manoeuvre
of drawing out to pass a vehicle in front with another vehicle meet-
ing him and be able to show that he would have succeeded in his
calculated intention but for some increase in speed in the vehicles
in front-a case very doubtful of manslaughter but very probably
of dangerous driving."
In the instance stated, it would seem clear that the reason which
would make a conviction of manslaughter very doubtful is the
fact that the collision and death were not legal consequences of the
29Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 120b.
30[1937] A. C. 576, 53 T. L. R. 663.31Dean, Manslaughter and Dangerous Driving, (1937) 53 L Quart.
Rev. 380; and see page 306; (1937) 1 Journal of Criminal Law 422, 431;
Davies, Manslaughter-Negligent Driving, (1937) 1 Modern L. Rev. 242.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
act of the driver in question. What kept him from succeeding in his
intention were the acts of the drivers of the vehicles in front in
increasing their speed. It seems, also, that such a defendant
should not be convicted on a prosecution for dangerous driving
when the dangerous driving, if any, was the act, not of the defend-
ant, but of some other driver or drivers. If it is "perfectly possible"
that one may drive dangerously and thereby cause the death of
another, and yet not be guilty of manslaughter, it is very desirable
that, in the presentation of a proposition so difficult to accept, the
possibility be illustrated by a case in which the driver is doing
the driving which actually causes the death.
In each of the four situations presented under Case 4, it would
seem clear that the killing of X was not the act of D, and that D
*as therefore not only not guilty of a criminal homicide, but that D
had not even committed a homicide.
III. UNINTENDED HOMICIDE
CASE 5. EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE BY NEGLIGENCE.
The facts:
While D is driving an automobile he sees an object lying in
the highway which he believes to be a bundle of clothing. 1-fe
drives his car over the object. He then learns that the object is
in fact a man, X, who has been struck by a passing car and left
lying in the highway. X dies of the injuries inflicted by D's
automobile.
The question to be determined upon these facts is whether or
not D may be convicted of a criminal homicide.
It will be sufficient at this time to consider the facts stated on
the basis of fundamental principles underlying the criminal law,
without taking up the definition of any criminal offense.
First, with regard to the act, D did the act of driving his car
over X and killing him. Clearly the killing was not an accident,
as tested by the illustrations in Case 4. In the present case, D
acted, and he acted with competent mental self-direction. D
originated the physical movement, continued it through the cir-
cumstances stated, to the consequence of X's death, which was the
conclusion of D's act in question. D did what he intended to do,
namely, to run over the object lying in the highway.
The question, then, becomes solely one of criminal intent. D
did not have a full intent because he did not intend to injure X.
MANSLAUGHTER BY MOTORISTS
He cannot, therefore, be guilty of intended homicide. Did he have
an imperfect intent, namely, the intent to do an act dangerous to
the lives and safety of others?
The question of the existence of an imperfect intent depends
for its answer on the effect of D's mistake in thinking that X, as
he lay in the highway, was merely a bundle of clothing. If D can
establish satisfactorily that his mistake was reasonable under all
of the circumstances, he can not be said to have had the criminal
intent to drive his car in a manner dangerous to the life of X or
of any other person. If the object had in fact been a bundle of
clothing, it is apparent that D would have been doing nothing
unlawful in driving the car over the bundle.
"The wrongful intent being the essence of every crime," says
Bishop, "it necessarily follows that whenever one without fault
or carelessness is misled concerning facts, and acts as he would
be justified in doing were they what he believes them to be, he
is legally innocent the same as he is innocent morally." 2
It is clear, therefore, that if D acted with reasonable regard
for the rights of others, and without fault or carelessness, he did
not have the imperfect intent in question. He would therefore
be excused from liability for a criminal homicide.
If, on the other hand, the full facts showed that D acted un-
reasonably and without due regard for the life and safety of X,
or of anyone else, in driving as he did, D may be convicted of the
homicide requiring imperfect intent, namely, involuntary homicide.
The definition of that crime by common law and by statute, and a
consideration of the circumstances under which D may be guilty
of it, are taken up in the next section, Case 6.
Even though D may not have had an imperfect criminal intent,
as defined in the preceding paragraphs, his conduct with regard to
X may have fallen below the standard of legal duty, which D
owed X as a fellow human being, not to do acts which might cause
X injury or loss.32a In other words, even if D were excused from
liability for criminal homicide, and a fortiori, if he should be held
criminally liable, D may be liable in tort for negligent homicide in
causing X's death. The test of D's liability would be whether or
not his conduct with respect to X was that which an average rea-
321 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed. 1923) 204.
3-This general legal duty is to be distinguished from a prescribed or
special legal duty, based on contract or on a relationship established by
common law or by statute. The omission to discharge a special legal duty may
supply the criminal intent for involuntary manslaughter.
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sonable man would have shown under the circumstances. Stated
more fully the test of his liability for negligence would be:
Did he omit to do something which a reasonable man guided
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or did he do something which the prudent
and reasonable man would not do ?33
If the jury, applying the test, should think that D acted as an
average reasonable man would have acted under all the circum-
stances, they may find him not liable to pay damages in tort based
upon the killing of X. If, however, they should find that he acted
without due care, they would find him liable in tort. So far,
however, as his criminal liability was concerned, this judgment in
tort would be of no significance. Although liable in tort for
negligence, he may be excused under the criminal law because of
his mistake of fact, and his killing of X would then be an excusable
homicide by negligence.
There is some relationship, however, between negligent tort
and criminal involuntary manslaughter. This relationship will be
discussed in the next section, Case 6.
CASE 6. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
The facts:
While D is driving an automobile, he starts to pass the car
ahead of his own car, on a two-lane highway, at a point where the
highway ascends a ridge. He is driving at a speed of sixty miles
an hour. As he draws abreast of the car ahead, near the crest of
the ridge, he strikes head-on a car driven by X, who is traveling
lawfully in his proper lane. X is killed in the collision.
The question to be determined upon these facts is whether or
not D may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
To state a general definition of involuntary manslaughter is
almost an impossibility.3 4 Even for a particular jurisdiction, the
definition is often a matter of uncertainty. The situation is due in
part to the fact that the offense of manslaughter developed histori-
cally as a "catch-all" crime, into which were thrown all unlawful
homicides which fell short of murder. It is called "the most
elastic of crimes."3 Three of the results are that the definitions
33Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex. 781.
34"Of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties of
definition." Lord Atkin, in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[1937] A. C. 576, 53 T. L. R. 663.35Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th ed. 1936) 141.
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stated by common law and by statutes differ widely, are often not
dearly or concisely stated, and are burdened with out-moded legal
terminology.
A common law definition as applied in a recent motor man-
slaughter case is the following:
"Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human
being unintentionally and without malice, express or implied, but
in the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony,
or some lawful act in an unlawful or negligent manner.""0
One significant difference, among many differences between
the various common law definitions of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter, consists in the inclusion or the exclusion of the clause
"in the commission of some lawful act in an unlawful manner." In
the definitions given in the treatises on the criminal law, this clause
is included, either exactly or substantially as stated, by some
writers and it is not included by others. It is included by Brac-
ton,3" Brill, 38 Clark and Marshall, 5 Kenny,4  Miller,4
1 Russell,'4
and Wharton.13 It is not stated as a part of the definition by Arch-
bold,"4 Bishop,45, Blackstone,"4  Chitty,'7 Coke,4  East,40  Harris
and Wilshire,50 Hawkins, 5 and Stephen." It is included by
Corpus Juris53 and by Ruling Case Law.5"
The statutory definitions of the criminal offense of involuntary
manslaughter, like the common law definitions, vary greatly. One
prominent difference is again the inclusion or the exclusion of the
36State v. Wheelock, (1933) 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W. 617, 619.37Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 120b.
Of course the term "involuntary manslaughter" was not invented and
established until more than five hundred years after Bracton wrote. See
notes 80 and 82, infra.
382 Brill, Cyclopedia of Criminal Law (1923) 1116.39Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, (3d ed. 1927)
325.
4OKenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, (15th ed. 1936) 135, et seq.
41Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law (1934) 285.
421 Russell, Crimes & Misdemeanors, (8th ed. 1923) 740, et seq.
'31 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) 664.
44Archbold, Summary of the Law ... in Criminal Cases (Jervis 5 Am.
ed. 1846), 488.
452 Bishop, A Treatise on Criminal Law, (9th ed. 1923) 562, 563.
462 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Sharswood's ed.
1868), Book IV, 190, 191.
473 Chitty, Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law (1826) 729.
48 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, 3d part (1797) 54.
491 East, Pleas of the Crown (1806) 260, et seq.50Harris and Wilshire, Principles & Practice of Criminal Law, (15th
ed. 1933) 196.
511 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (1824) 85-89.
52Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (1877) 392.
5329 Corpus Juris 1148.
5'13 Ruling Case Law 784.
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same clause, "the commission of some lawful act in an unlawful
manner." The United States Code includes the clause, defining
the offense as follows:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of two kinds: Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful
act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without
due caution and circumspection.""r
The statutes of at least seventeen of the states5" and of Porto Rico
and of the Canal Zone definitely include the clause.
The differences in the statutory definitions are no doubt due
in part to the differences in the common law definitions. The
offense of involuntary manslaughter is defined by statutes using
the same terms as common law definitions, in the United States
Code,57 in the criminal codes of eighteen of the states,"' of
Porto Rico59 and of the Canal Zone. 0 The definition of the offense
is left to the common law by statutes which penalize involuntary
manslaughter as a crime without defining it, in fifteen states,"
and in the District of Columbia. 2 The shortest and most ancient
form of the common law definitions of manslaughter, namely,
5518 U. S. C. A. sec. 453, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 453.56Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois.
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Mexico. North Carolina, Oregon.
Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia.
5718 U. S. C. A. sec. 453, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 453.58Arizona, Rev. Code 1928, sec. 4586; Arkansas, Digest of Statutes
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) sec. 2356; California, Penal Code (Deering,
1931) secs. 192, 193; Colorado, Ann. Stat. (Courtright's Mills 1928) secs.
1754, 1757, 1758; Georgia Code 1933, sec. 26-1006, 1009, 1010; Idaho, Code
Ann. 1932, secs. 17-1106, 1107; Illinois, Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 38, secs. 361,
363, 364; Indiana, Stats. (Burns 1933) sec. 10-3405, enacted 1927; Mississippi,
Code Ann. 1930, secs. 990, 994 (variations from common law terms) ; Mon-
tana, Rev. Code 1935, secs. 10959, 10960; Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, sec.
28-403; Nevada, Comp. Laws (Hillyer's 1929) sec. 10069, 10072, 10073;
New Mexico, Stat. Ann. 1929, secs. 35-305, 306; Oregon Code 1930, secs.
14-205, 206; South Carolina, Code of Laws 1932, sec. 1107; Tennessee, Code
1932, sec. 10774, 10776; Utah, Rev. Stat. 1933, sec. 103-28-5, 6; Wyoming,
Comp. Laws 1920, sec. 7070.59Porto Rico, Rev. Stat. 1913, sec. 5624, 5625.
OCanal Zone, Code 1934, title 5, secs. 256, 257.6
'Connecticut, Gen. Stat. Supp. 1935, sec. 6046; Delaware, Rev. Code
1935, ch. 149, sec. 5161; Iowa, Code 1935, ch. 559, sec. 12919; Louisiana,
Rev. Laws (Wolff, 1904) R. S. 785-786; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 129,
sec. 2; Maryland, Ann. Code (Bagby 1924) art. 27, sec. 354; Massachusetts,
Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 265, sec. 13; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 16717;
2 New Jersey, Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 1781, sec. 109; North Carolina, Code
1931, sec. 4201; Pennsylvania, Stats. (Purdon, 1936) title 18, sec. 2226:
Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923, ch. 395, sec. 6015; Virginia, Code 1930, sec.
4397; Vermont, Public Laws 1933, ch. 335, sec. 8377; West Virginia, Code
1932, ch. 61, sec. 5920.62District of Columbia, Code 1929. title 6, sec. 25, p. 41.
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every unlawful homicide not amounting to murder, has been
enacted in words or in substance in three states," in Hawaii,"
and in the Philippine Islands.65 Multiple degrees of manslaughter
and murder which cover the offense of involuntary manslaughter
as known to the common law have been enacted in ten states"
and in Alaska.6 7  Kentucky does not have the common law offense
of involuntary manslaughter, but it has a statute establishing com-
mon law voluntary manslaughter, and a statutory offense called
unintentional killing.6 Texas since 1879 has had an offense
known as homicide by negligence, in two degrees, which has part
of the scope of the common law offense of involuntary man-
slaughter.6 9
A new type of offense, commonly called negligent homicide, has
been created in thirteen states,70 in the District of Columbia,-" in
Canada72 and in England.73  It is designed principally to take
care of unlawful homicide by automobile drivers.
63Florida, Comp. Laws 1927, sec. 7141; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sec.
3988; Ohio, Ann. Code (Throckmorton's 1924) sec. 12404.
"4Hawaii, Rev. L. 1925, secs. 4119, 4120.
651 Philippine Islands, Penal Code 1930, art. 404.66The statutory offenses which seem to include the common law offense
of involuntary manslaughter are indicated below for each of the ten states:
Alabama: Manslaughter in first degree and in second degree. Code 1928.
sec. 4460. Kansas: Manslaughter in first degree, in third degree, and in
fourth degree. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1935) secs. 21-407, 413, 414, 419,
420, 422, 423. Minhesota: Murder in third degree and manslaughter in
first degree and in second degree. Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats. sees. 10070,
10073, 10074, 10077, 10078, 10086. New Hampshire: Manslaughter in first
degree and in second degree. Pub. Laws 1926, p. 1509, ch. 392, sec. 8. 9.
New York: Manslaughter in first degree and in second degree. Criminal
and Penal Code (Gilbert, 1933) sees. 1049-1053. North Dakota: Man-
slaughter in first degree and in second degree. Comp. Laws 1913, sees. 9470.
9471, 9474, 9475, 9488, 9491. Oklahoma: Manslaughter in first degree and
in second degree. Comp. Stat. 1921, sees. 1740, 1745. South Dakota:
Murder in first degree and manslaughter in first degree and in second
degree. Comp. Laws 1929, sees. 4020, 4023, 4024. Washington: Murder
in second degree and manslaughter. Comp. Stat. (Remington 1922) sees.
2392, 2393, 2395. Wisconsin: Murder in second degree and manslaughter
in first and in fourth degree. Stats. 1931, sees. 340.03, 340.08, 340.10, 34025.67Alaska, Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 1886.68Kentucky, Stats. (Carroll 1936) Rev. sees. (Baldwin) 1150, 1151.69Texas, Stats. (Vernon 1926) Penal Code, arts. 1231, 1237, 1241.
7OCalifornia, Stats. 1935, p. 2141; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. Supp. 1931.
1933, 1935, p. 733; Louisiana, Stats. 1930, p. 141; Michigan, Stats. 1921, p.
217; modified 1931, p. 624, 689; Minnesota, Laws 1937, p. 743; Nebraska.
Stats. 1919, p. 830; New Hampshire, Sp. Sess. 1930, p. 85; New Jersey,
Stats. 1935, p. 913; Ohio, Stats. 1935, p. 205; Oregon Laws 1937, p. 763;
Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, sec. 5152; Washington, Laws 1937, p. 911;
Wyoming, Stats. 1921, p. 70, Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, sec. 72-128.
rD. C. (74th Cong. 1st Sess. 1935, p. 301).72Canada, Statutes 1930, p. 162, ch. 11, sec. 25.
73England, 20 & 21 Geo. V, 1930, ch. 43, and 24 & 25 Geo. V, 1934,
ch. 50, sec. 34.
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The penalty imposed for the offense now known as involuntary
manslaughter by the early common law was death. At the present
time in England the normal sentence for involuntary manslaughter
is reported to be six months' imprisonment.7 4 In the United States
involuntary manslaughter is a felony, and the minimum penalty in
many states is one year's imprisonment; the maximum imprison-
ment as set in some states is twenty years. The penalties provided
by the negligent homicide statutes are not appreciably lower than
the penalties which are provided and imposed under the involun-
tary manslaughter statutes.
It is now necessary to consider the act and the criminal intent
which are defined by the law of involuntary manslaughter. The
federal statute, as set out above, will be used as the basis of this
analysis.
A. THE ACT.
The act specified by the definition of the law as the act element
of the offense of involuntary manslaughter is the act of killing a
human being. In several of the new negligent homicide statutes,
it should be observed that the act specified is not the killing of a
human being, but it is the driving or the. operating of an automobile
in such a manner that death of a person results.
In applying the law defining the offense to the facts of the
case stated, what does the state have to prove in order to convict D
of the offense of involuntary manslaughter? The state must prove
first, (1) that D did the act specified by the statute, namely, that
D killed X. In order to establish this fact, it will be necessary for
the state to be ready to prove, (a) that D's physical movements,
as such, were under adequate mental self-direction, and (b) that
D actually made one or more of a related group of physical move-
ments leading to the death of X. In regard to (a), under the
facts stated the evidence indicates, in the absence of any question to
the contrary, that D's act was competently self-directed, so far as
adequate mental control by D of his own physical movements was
concerned. In regard to (b), the physical movement element of
the act, the facts stated show the following series of significant
events which, at the time of the injury to X, made up this part of
the act. The origin of the act consisted in D accelerating his car
and turning out to pass the car in front of him. The significant
circumstances included the two-lane highway with the road ahead
not visible to D because of the ridge, the fact that other moving
74Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th ed. 1936) 141.
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automobiles were on the road, and the collision of the automobile
driven by D with the automobile driven by X. The consequence
was the resulting death of X. The act or homicide is established
by the facts stated.
B. THE CRIMINAL INTENT.
In addition to proving the act or homicide, the state must also
prove, (2) that D had the criminal intent specified by the legal
definition of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.
Before discussing the criminal intent specified by the definition
in the statute, there must be a consideration of certain words of
the statute which are sometimes mistakenly thought to be part
of the definition of the criminal intent element of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter. These words are unlawfid, without
nalice and involuntary.
The first sentence of the statute quoted above,--nanslaughter
is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice,"-is an
introductory summary of the two elements of the offense, the act
and the criminal intent. It indicates the historical and actual
nature of the crime of manslaughter, namely, any unlawful killing
which is not murder. The word unlawful serves simply to sum
up the fact that the killing is contrary to the law as stated by the
criminal intent clauses which follow in the legal definition of the
crime, and that the killing is without legal justification or excuse.
The expression without malice, in the same sentence, serves to
distinguish the offense of manslaughter from murder. It does
not mean that there is no criminal intent in involuntary man-
slaughter.7 5  It means that the criminal intent in involuntary
75Luther v. State, (1912) 177 Ind. 619, 626, 98 N. E. 640 quoting
Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry., (1903) 184 Mass. 269, 271, 68 N. E. 238: "The
law is regardful of human life and personal safety, and if one is grossly
and wantonly reckless in exposing others to danger it holds him to have
intended the natural consequences of his act and treats him as guilty of a
wilful and intentional wrong. It is no defense to a charge of manslaughter
to show that, while grossly reckless, he did not actually intend to cause the
death of his victim." State v. Schutte, (1915) 87 N. J. L. 118, 93 Atl.
112: ". . . an intention to injure need not be specifically directed to the
particular individual that was injured, but may be inferred in law from the
consequences that are naturally to be apprehended as the result of the
particular act, the doing of which was intentional. 'The prisoner,' said Lord
Coleridge, Chief Justice, in Queen v. Martin, 8 Q. B. D. 54, 'must be
taken to have intended the natural consequence of that which he did. He
acted unlawfully .. . not that he had any personal malice against tht
particular individual injured but in the sense of doing an act calculated to
injure and by which others were, in fact, injured.'" State v. Moore,
(1906) 129 Iowa 604, 106 N. W. 16: "Negligence and reckless indifference
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manslaughter is different from that in murder and in voluntary
manslaughter. The term malice, it must be remembered, is de-
fined and used with numerous meanings. It is used here to mean
that the killing is done without "any of those more guilty forms
of malice which amount to Murderous Malice," 7 6 in other words,
"malice aforethought."
The expression involuntary as used in the statutory definition
of the crime serves simply and solely to distinguish and to set
apart that type of unlawful killing which is not murder and which
is not voluntary manslaughter. It has, in effect, the same mean-
ing as the term without malice, discussed above. The distinguish-
ing difference between voluntary manslaughter and involuntary
manslaughter is the difference in the criminal intent. The intent in
both murder and voluntary manslaughter is the full intent to kill
a specific individual.7 7 The term voluntary originated probably in
Bracton's classification homicidium voluntate . 7  The intent in
involuntary manslaughter is an imperfect criminal intent." No
collective term was established to denominate homicides not hav-
ing a full intent until the term involuntary wvas introduced by
Blackstone, merely as a term of classification but not necessarily of
definition."0  The term involuntary, therefore, as used in the
to the lives and safety of others will supply the intent for the purposes of
the criminal law. It is a maxim of law that every sane person" is held
"to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his voluntary act."
Contra: State v. Wheelock, (1933) 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W. 617, quoting
State v. Korth, (1928) 204 Iowa 1360, 217 N. W. 236, 237. "An intent to
kill is not an essential element of the offense and its absence distinguishes it
from voluntary manslaughter." An equally indefensible statement is quoted
from Commonwealth v. Gill, note 120, infra.7 6Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th ed. 1936) 130.77See note 9 supra.
7 8
"Intentional (homicidium) : as, if one with full knowledge, by pre-
meditated assault, through anger, or ill will, or for sake of gain, miserably
and feloniously and against the peace of the Lord King kills another."
Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f. 121. This
definition seems adequate to state full intent.
79See notes 10 and 11 supra. The word "unintentionally" appears in
some definitions of the offense. See text at note 36 supra. In such use,
the word can not mean "without criminal intent," because the same definitions
include other words or clauses, for example, "in the commission of an
unlawful act," which thus expressly prescribe an imperfect or indirect
criminal intent. The word "unintentionally," therefore, must mean without
the full or direct criminal intent to kill the particular person who is killed.8OThe "unhappy term" involuntary inamslaughter . . . "seems to be a
creation of text books and judges, not statutory." Buckland and McNair,
Roman Law and Common Law (1936) 198 ff. Blackstone, in his textbook,
seems to cite Hale as his authority for the term. 2 Blackstone, Corn-
mentaries on the Laws of England, (Sharwood's ed. 1868), book IV, 190.
The citation does not support Blackstone. 1 Hale, The History of the
Pleas of the Crown (1678) 466, cf. 471. Blackstone has been accepted as
the "creator" of the term as a name for the already long-existing offense.
Cf. Bracton, note 82 infra.
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statute, merely means "without full intent," and it does not fully or
accurately characterize the criminal intent which is required in a
particular individual in order that he be guilty of the crime. It is
primarily and historically a name given to a particular class of
crimes in order to contrast the one class, namely, involmary
manslaughter, with another class, namely voluatary manslaughter.
The criminai intent specified by the definition of the law as the
criminal intent element of the offense of involuntary manslaughter
must then be found in the following words: (a) in the commission
of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or (b) in the com-
mission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner or without due caution and circumspection.
The second branch (b) of this description of the criminal intent
is, in effect, either a contradiction of terms"' or it is a repetition of
the first branch (a). Its origin in English law is Bracton. In his
classification of homicide, his third class is homnicidiun casu. He
says, in regard to this class, "a distinction must be made whether
the person was engaged in an undertaking of a lawful nature, or of
an unlawful nature.1
8 2
Copying Bracton's words, some subsequent legal writers have
continued this division to the present day. It has already been
observed, however, that the majority of them do not include the
second branch of the definition."' It has been observed, likewise,
that it appears in only a minority of the statutes now in force, in-
cluding the federal statute which is now under consideration.8 '
Although the second branch of the quoted definition of the
criminal intent is not a part of the definition of involuntary man-
slaughter which is stated by most of the text writers and statutes,
and although it has been severely criticized by Stephen and by
81
"A 'lawful act criminally performed' is a contradiction in terms."
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (1887) sec. 5, 391, 392. See also
Pike, Comment on Death Caused by Drunken Driving, California Penal
Code, (1936) 9 So. Cal. L. Rev. 142, 147.82Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (1250-1256) f.
120b, 121. The quotation continues, "If unlawful, as if one threw a stone
across a place through which men were accustomed to pass, or while one is
chasing a horse or ox and another is killed by the ox or horse, and in cases
of this sort, the homicide is charged to him. If in fact he was doing an act
of a lawful sort, as if .. . one were unloading a haywain or were cutting
down a tree ... if he used such diligence as he could, namely by looking
around and by shouting, but not too slowly or softly, but promptly and
loudly, and so that if anyone were coming there he could run or save
himself ... it (the homicide) is not charged to him. But if he does the act
of a lawful sort and does not employ due diligence, it will be charged to
him."
83See notes 44 to 52 inclusive, supra.
s'See notes 55 and 56 supra.
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others, it does require some attention. Originally, as Bracton's
illustrations indicate, it was the negligent performance of tile
lawful act which supplied the criminal intent which made tile un-
intended killing, done in the performance of the lawful act, a
crime. Eventually courts and legal writers came to say that a
lawful act was indeed an unlawful act if it were performed in a
manner dangerous to the rights, safety or lives of human beings, 5
In this way courts in jurisdictions having the second branch in
their code have in effect reduced the confusing clause simply to
the words, (b) in the commission of an unlawful act.
When the courts came to consider the act of driving autoio-
biles they readily saw that such an act is emphatically an act "which
might produce death." 8'1 When. therefore, this lawful act is
done "in an unlawful manner or without due caution and
circumspection," the courts are ready to call it an "unlawful
act" for the purpose of the intent required for involuntary man-
slaughter.
The criminal intent element of involuntary manslaughter as
defined in the first branch of the statute is as follows: (a) In the
commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony. It
should be noted first that the term unlawfd act does not mean the
act of killing for which the defendant is being held for involuntary
manslaughter. It means instead some unlawful act which the
killer was doing, as for example, unlawfully driving an auto-
mobile, in the doing of which he caused the death of a human
being. The words unlawful act as used in this clause formerly
meant something far different from what they now mean as used
in the cases. The words "unlawful act," in the early applications
of the term in involuntary manslaughter, meant an act specifically
made a crime by common law or by statute. The rule was that if
a person was engaged in the commission of any act made unlawful
by common law or by statute, and while so engaged killed another
person without the full intent to do so, the killing was either mur-
85State v. Dorsey (1889) 118 Ind. 167, 169, 20 N. E. 777: "A lawful
act done in an unlawful or negligent manner, is in law an unlawful act ...
We do not mean to be understood as holding that every careless or negligent
act whereby death ensues" is a crime. . .. "To constitute manslaughter the
act causing the death must be of such a character as to show a wanton or
reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others, but not necessarily
an act denounced by the statute as a specific crime." Commonwealth v. Hunt,
(1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 128: "We use the terms criminal or unlawful
because it is manifest that many crimes are unlawful which are not punishable
by indictment or other public prosecution."
8618 U. S. C. A. Sec. 453, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 453.
8718 U. S. C. A. Sec. 453, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 18, sec. 453.
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der or manslaughter, depending simply upon whether the unlaw-
ful act was, respectively, a felony or a misdemeanor. This rule
was the origin of the confusing phrase in the definition "not
amounting to a felony." Coke, with no authority to support him,",
stated the rule that to kill any person without direct intention in
the commission of any unlawful act was murder. 69 Foster modi-
fied this rule by saying that an unintentional killing in the com-
mission of an unlawful act amounting to a felony would be murder,
but that if the unlawful act be a "bare trespass"-what we may call
a misdemeanor-the offense would be manslaughter." Upon Fos-
ter's modification of the rule is based the phrase in the common
law and statutory expression "an unlawful act not amounting to
a felony," or in other words, an unlawful act which is a misde-
meanor. But this phrase "not amounting to a felony" is not of much
present day importance, because courts have ruled that it is not
the fact that the subordinate act, either misdemeanor or felony,
is prohibited by statute, but that it is the characteristics of the pro-
hibited subordinate act that make the unintended killing a crimeY'
If the subordinate act is dangerous to the lives and safety of others,
then a killing, though unintended, which occurs in the commission
of the subordinate act is a criminal homicide, provided, of course,
that the killing was the natural or necessary consequence of the
subordinate act.9 2 Consequently theocourts have brought the mean-
ing of the first branch of the intent clause of the statute on in-
voluntary manslaughter to a present day meaning which is the
same as their present day interpretation of the second branch. In
effect then, the second branch is a repetition of the first branch.
In order to determine the criminal intent element of involuntary
manslaughter which is specified by one of the common law defini-
tions of that crime, as it is stated and typified in the federal code,
it has been necessary to examine certain words and clauses of the
statute.93 First, it has been made apparent that three of the ex-
883 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 57.
89Coke, Third Institute (1644) 56.9OFoster, Discourses (1762) 258, quoted by 3 Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England (1883) 75.91Davis v. Com. (1928) 150 Va. 611, 143 S. E. 641: Held, that the
unlawful character of the act is determined by the fact that it is performed
in disregard of the lives and safety of others. The fact that it is unlawful
by statute is not enough. Potter v. State (1904) 162 Ind. 213, 70 N. E.
129: Held, that mere doing of the prohibited act did not render the defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter.92Potter v. State, (1904) 162 Ind. 213, 216, 70 N. E. 129.
93The statute analyzed is one of the long form varieties of the common
law definitions of involuntary manslaughter. The points considered. there-
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pressions in the definition, namely, wnlawful (killing), zeithout
malice and involuntary do not constitute any part of the criminal
intent element of the crime. It has become apparent, therefore, that
the statement of the criminal intent element, in the definition, must
be found in one or both of the clauses beginning with the words
"in the commission of" some act. Second, an examination of these
two clauses demonstrates that each of them has come to mean,
under modern decisions: in the commission of an unlawful act.
The definition, moreover, of such unlawful act, as laid down by the
courts, is found to be an act which is dangerous to the lives and
safety of others.
The criminal intent element of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter, therefore, is the intent to do an act, which is dangerous
to the lives and safety of others. This statement of the criminal
intent, however, is indefinite. It is not sufficiently specific to aid
the jurors in deciding whether or not the defendant, in the par-
ticular case on trial, committed the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter. What tests can the court give the jurors which they can
apply to the acts of the defendant, as testified to by the witnesses,
and thereupon make their decision in regard to the existence of
criminal intent ?
Stating more fully the preceding question, in the trial of D
on an indictment for involuntary manslaughter based upon the
facts stated in this case, Case 6, what instructions shall the court
give to the jury in order to assist them to decide whether or not
D's act in driving the car as he did, under all of the circumstances,
was an act dangerous enough to the lives and safety of others to
warrant the jury in finding that D, in his intent to do such act,
had the criminal intent necessary for involuntary manslaughter?
Facing this problem, many courts use the concept of negligence
as their starting point. The reasons for this approach are clear.
In the first place the word negligence is often applied in common
speech to the conduct of a driver who is involved in an automobile
collision. The judges, moreover, are accustomed to the use of
negligence tests in civil cases. Historically, also, the term "due
diligence" has a lineage dating back to Bracton.
Such courts often explain to the jury at the outset the test
for civil liability according to the standard of the average reason-
fore, have included the points which may arise for consideration in the short
form definitions. This analysis, therefore, will serve, either directly or by
analogy, as a basis for an analysis of the terms of the shorter form statutes
defining involuntary manslaughter.
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able man.94 Immediately, however, the court warns the jury that
civil negligence is not enough for a crime.95 Criminal law, it is
pointed out, requires criminal intent in addition to the mere negli-
gent conduct sufficient for a tort recovery. The question then
becomes, how much "negligence" must there be to supply the
criminal intent necessary for the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter?
It will be seen that if D's contemplated act was such *that he
realized that its consequences were likely to be dangerous, or if
it was such an act that he should have realized its dangerousness be-
cause the average reasonable and prudent man would have realized
that fact, and if he nevertheless did the act, then he had the
criminal intent required for manslaughter.
The words and-tests which the courts use in answering the
question of the existence of criminal intent fall principally, but
with some overlapping and changing, into two groups. One group
describes its tests in terms of negligent omissions to act. The
other group describes its tests in terms of acts done recklessly."
In the first group, the negligence which is required in order
that it may constitute criminal intent is described as "criminal,"
"culpable," or "gross." A statistical study on this point has been
made of the two or three most recent decisions, to and including
the year 1937, in cases of involuntary manslaughter, or of the
corresponding offense, in the forty-nine American jurisdictions,
and in England. This study discloses that the following terms
appear in the number of jurisdictions stated: "criminal negligence,"
in fifteen jurisdictions ;97 "culpable negligence," in sixteen jurisdic-
tions;98 "gross negligence," in fifteen jurisdictions.9  The word
"'careless" appears in a few jurisdictions, used in the sense of "neg-
94See text at note 33 supra.
95State v. Schutte, (1915) 87 N. J. L. 118, 93 Ad. 112; State v.
McIver, (1917) 175 N. C. 761, 94 S. E. 682; Luther v. State (1912) 117
Ind. 619, 624, 98 N. E. 640; Rex v. Baldessare, (1930) 22 Crim. App. 70,
144 L. T. R. 185. 5 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7th ed. 1935) sec. 5.379.
Also, see Case 5, text supra.96The tendency in the decisions is away from the negligent omission
tests and toward the reckless act tests.97England, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, Washington, Wyoming.
98Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming.
99England, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Caro-
lina, Washington, Wisconsin.
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ligent," and in a few jurisdictions in combination with other terms.
These words, criminal, culpable and gross, appear to be used more
or less synonymously to mean negligence which is sufficiently above
tort negligence to constitute the criminal intent required for
involuntary manslaughter.
As an example of the "criminal negligence" tests laid down by
the courts in this group, the following test, a judicially approved00
test in England, may be considered:
"In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such
that in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went
beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and
showed such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to
amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving of
punishment. '"' 0 '
The following tests, taken from American decisions, are per-
haps more definite:
"And if the injury occasioned by the collision results in death,
the culpable driver may be justly convicted of manslaughter if
the collision was caused directly by such gross carelessness as to
imply an indifference to consequences. 1 2
"The difficulty of attaining perfection in defining 'culpable
negligence' is apparent, but it is agreed that the words necessarily
imply something more than a lack of precaution or the exercise
of ordinary care. An instruction to the jury merely in the words
of the latter proposition is not sufficient; it should explain where-
in the distinction exists. Ordinary negligence is based on the
theory that a person charged with negligent conduct should have
known the probable consequences of his act; culpable negligence
rests on the assumption that he knew [is held to have known or
should have known] the probable consequences, but was inten-
tionally, recklessly or wantonly indifferent to the results."'
Assuming that the court of the jurisdiction in which the indict-
ment agaipst D is filed should give the English instruction to the
jury, or an instruction to the jury based on the foregoing Ameri-
can decisions, it would then be the task of the jury to apply the
criminal negligence test to D's act in order to decide whether or
not D under the facts stated and in evidence had the criminal intent
required for the crime of involuntary manslaughter.
In the second group of words and tests, the criminal intent
100In Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1937] A. C. 576, 53
T. L. R. 663.
0'lRex v. Bateman, (1925) 19 Crim. App. 8, 94 L. J. K. B. 791.102Luther v. State, (1912) 177 Ind. 619, 624, 98 N. E. 640.
103State v. Stansell, (1932) 203 N. C. 69, 164 S. E. 580.
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which is required for involuntary manslaughter is described as the
doing of the act (for example, the driving of an automobile) in a
specified manner, namely, "wantonly," "wilfully," or "recklessly."
In the statistical study of the decisions, to which reference has been
made, the following terms, and the combinations of terms in which
they appear, are found in the number of jurisdictions stated:
"wanton," in eleven jurisdictions ;104 "Wilful," in six jurisdic-
tions;1O5 "reckless," in twenty-six jurisdictions;'" acts "in dis-
regard of the lives and safety of others," or in disregard of similar
rights, in twenty jurisdictions ;10 "careless and reckless," in nine
jurisdictions ;108 and other combinations, among which is the com-
bination "vilful, wanton and reckless" in three jurisdictions. 0°
These words appear to be used more or less synonymously in the
decisions to-describe a test of the conduct of a defendant in the fol-
lowing terms, namely, that he did not merely fail to realize danger,
but that he both realized the danger and nevertheless chose to gc
ahead; or that he failed to realize the gravity of the danger as an
average prudent man would have done, and went ahead and did
the acts which included a fatal consequence110
The test, therefore, of the second group may be called the
reckless or dangerous act test. As an example of this test,
as laid down by a court belonging to this general group, the fol-
lowing part of an instruction, which received judicial acceptance
in Massachusetts, may be considered:
"In this case the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to
satisfy you that the conduct of the defendant.. . in failing to take
proper means and precautions to ascertain if anyone else was us-
ing the highway and to ascertain the presence of anybody else
on the highway, if his conduct is found by you to be wanton, reck-
04Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah.
2o5California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Utah, Wash-
ington.
loBUnited States, England, Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington.07Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wash-
ington.
lOsKentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington.
'19California, Massachusetts, Utah.
"9See Dangel, and Justice Lummus, Involuntary Manslaughter, (1929)
1 Law Society of Mass. J. 6.
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less conduct in utter disregard and indifference to the rights of
others ... then the defendant is guilty of manslaughter.""'
Instructions or tests given in a recent Indiana trial, are as follows:
"A person will not be permitted to do an act which jeopardizes
the life and safety of another and then, upon plea of accident, es-
cape liability for a homicide . . . resulting from his recklessness or
careless act or conduct."
"One may be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, if he con-
ducts himself, in a given set of circumstances, with such wilful"'
disregard for the rights of others as to show a wanton recklessness
as to the life and limb of other persons." This and the preceding
instruction are based on Minardo v. State,"3 and related cases.
The various terms applied as the test to be used in determining
the presence or absence of criminal intent, namely, criminal or
culpable or gross negligence, and wilful or wanton" 4 or reckless"'
act, are brought by judicial decision to mean substantially this: a
legally inexcusable disregard for the life and safety of others."'
"'Commonwealth v. Arone, (1928) 265 Mass. 128, 163 N. E. 758, 760.
"2Wilfil. "The running of a car at a high rate of speed is an act in
which the will of the driver concurs, and hence is clearly a wilful act as
distinguished from merely negligent conduct, when considered with respect
to the state of mind of the offender, which is what the criminal law con-
siders .... The excessive rate of speed at which an automobile is driven is
a product of the will of its driver and not the result of his mere inattention
or negligence." State v. Shutte, (1915) 87 N. J. L. 118, 93 Atl. 112.
113(1932) 204 Ind. 422, 183 N. E. 548.
1141Wanton and wilful are terms frequently employed in the automobile
guest statutes and they are therefore receiving increasing judicial attention.
See Appelman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases,(1937) 13 Ind. L. J. 131. Thomas v. Foody, (1936) 54 Ohio App. 423,
7 N. E. (2d) 820. Swan, J., saWs in Cusack v. Longaker, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1938) 95 F. (2d) 304: "We doubt if it is helpful to attempt to define 'wilful'
and 'wanton' separately in a charge to the jury. The phrase [wilful and
wanton misconduct] as a whole is rhetorical and implies no more than
excessively reprehensible conduct; such conduct as justifies an inference of
consciousness that injury may probably result from the act done and a
reckless disregard of consequences." Judge Swan's statement is a sound
statement, also, of the legal definition, as presented in this article, of the
criminal intent required for involuntary manslaughter. The provisions of
the guest statutes, like the legal definitions of the intent required for the
crime, are seen to be in need of less "rhetorical" language, and of more
specific wording such as that of Judge Swan's statement of the law.
'"The cases seldom contain what may be called "dictionary" defini-
tions of the terms used. The following dictionary meanings may be con-
sidered for the purpose of comparing them, with regard either to contrast
or to identity, with the legal usage of the terms: negligence, inadvertence,
carelessness; reckless, realizing the possibility of harmful consequences,
but going ahead with the act; wanton, foreseeing the probability of harm-
ful consequences, but acting without regard for them; wilful, intentional,
voluntary. The only definition of an "act" found in the cases examined
is quoted from Webster, "to produce an effect."
"16"The crime sought to be proven was involuntary homicide, caused by
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In view of the fact that these six adjectives, criminal, culpable and
gross, and wilful, wanton and reckless are used by the courts as
rhetorical expressions, and that each and all of them are used with
substantially the one meaning, it would be well to select one of the
words as the one most appropriate to express the test for the
criminal intent and to use that word to the exclusion of the
others. The word "reckless" is best suited for the purpose. It
is the word which, as we have seen, is already in most general
use by the courts. "Reckless," moreover, in common usage, by
jurors and generally, means heedless of probable consequences.
This meaning when applied to the endangering of human life is
the criminal intent required for involuntary manslaughter. The
word would therefore need no supplementary elaboration by the
court, and it would therefore avoid the resulting dangers of the
confusion of the required imperfect intent with negligence, with
true accident and with full intent.
It is now the task of the jury to apply the tests in deciding
whether or not D, under the circumstances stated and in evidence,
had acted with an inexcusable disregard for the life and safety of
others. If the jury find that he had so acted, they thereby find that
he had the criminal intent required for the crime of involuntary
manslaughter.
If the writer were on the jury in the case of State versus D,
and were applying the test or tests used in the jurisdiction of trial,
he would observe that D's act in its very origin of turning his car,
at sixty miles an hour, into X's lane of traffic at a place where D
could not see X coming and X could not see D coming, was un-
questionably an act so dangerous to the life and safety of others that
its performance was one in which D must have had the criminal
intent required for involuntary manslaughter. D must have
realized that his act of driving as he did at that time and place
would endanger the life and safety of others, but he chose to do
the act regardless of the danger. He intended, therefore, to do
an act which was dangerous to the life and safety of others. His
criminal intent, of course, was not a full criminal intent to kill X,
culpable negligence, and to make an act carelessly performed resulting in
death a criminal one, the carelessness must have been gross, implying an
indifference to consequences; and the word gross negligence means some-
thing more than mere negligence. It means wantonness and disregard of
the consequences which may ensue and indifference to the rights of others
that is equivalent to a criminal intent." People v. Barnes, (1914) 182 Mich.
179, 148 N. W. 400, 406, 407.
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but it was an actual imperfect criminal intent, which was just as
fatal to X as a full intent would have been.ll
"a
The automobile homicide participated in by motorist D and
the unfortunate victim X now has been carried through six pos-
sible cases under the criminal law. In each case the act of D, if
any, and the criminal intent of D, if any, have been investigated,
both on the facts and also with regard to the application of the
law to the facts.
CONCLUSION
The law of involuntary manslaughter and its application have
been observed to be in a very confused and unsatisfactory state,
both in the United States and in England. It is widely asserted by
prosecuting attorneys and by judges in the United States, and by
English officials, likewise, that it is extremely difficult to convict
an automobile driver on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. In
England the law, and especially ruling cases, are under severe
criticism. One English writer calls upon the Law Revision Com-
mission to overhaul the law of homicide to remove its "sophisms
and evasions" for the sake of the "lives of thousands of road users
very much at stake on our highways.11 1 7  Even the definition of
the crime of involuntary manslaughter, as this article has shown,
is indefinite, repetitious and burdened with words and clauses
which are mere historic survivals, and which serve only to confuse
and obstruct justice. The name of the offense furthermore, is a
handicap. The word "involuntary," as has been seen,"18 is merely
a distinguishing name." 0 But it is interpreted by defense counsel
and sometimes even by courts 2 ' to mean "unintentional" and there-
fore "accidental." The man who commits the crime of involuntary
manslaughter does not do so "involuntarily," or "accidentally," or
"unintentionally." To say that in committing involuntary man-
slaughter the offender does acts or kills in an involuntary manner
is as misleading as it would be to say that the offender who com-
mits grand larceny acts or steals in a grand manner. Such an un-
16aSee text at notes 7 to 13 inclusive, supra.
'"7Davies, Manslaughter-Negligent Driving, (1937) 1 Modern Law
Rev. 242.
118See text at note 80.
19The expression involuntary manslaughter, like the "equally unhappy"
term culpable negligence, "seems to be a creation of text books and judges,
not statutory." Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law
(1936) 198 ff.
120". .. for the fundamental element of involuntary manslaughter is
that it must be unintentional, accidental, involuntary." Commonwealth v.
Gill, (1935) 120 Pa. Super. 22, 35, 182 AtI. 103.
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warranted interpretation in effect eliminates the defendant's im-
perfect but real criminal intent, and even his act of driving his
car into the fatal collision."' Moreover, the word "manslaughter"
has a brutal sound to some jurors, who therefore hesitate to fasten
it on the defendant, who often makes a very good courtroom ap-
pearance. The use of the term "negligence" brings in again the
idea that the defendant acted without criminal intent, and this
impression on the jurors is often heightened by the court's warn-
ing that mere civil negligence is not enough for a conviction.' "
In the United States, furthermore, the penalties prescribed for
involuntary manslaughter often are considered by jurors, most of
whom are themselves drivers of automobiles, to be too severe,
especially if it appears that the deceased was perhaps at fault
in the collision. At the trial of such cases, moreover, sharp
conflicts in the evidence frequently arise, due to the facts that the
deceased is not available as a witness, that the collision usually
is accompanied by excitement which prevents accurate observation,
and that adequate police investigation is not made. 12'a Finally, the
question of civil damage suits and of recoveries on automobile in-
surance policies often add complicating factors.
Some of these difficulties can not be avoided. Others of them
can be avoided. One of the efforts in the latter direction is the
enactment of the negligent homicide statutes in various states,
which are cited elsewhere.123  These statutes, in general, make the
criminal act not the killing of a human being, but the driving, or
the operation, of the automobile in a specified manner or with a
specified result. They omit some of the troublesome clauses and
words which appear in the common law and statutory definitions
of involuntary manslaughter, including the name of the offense
itself. Unfortunately, however, they have not, in general, been
l2lThis extraordinary result was achieved in effect in State v. Whee-
lock, (1933) 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617.122English writers assert that the Bateman Case instruction fails to
define negligence, and merely leaves the whole question to the jury without
aid. See Davies, Manslaughter-Negligent Driving, (1937) 1 Modern L
Rev. 242; Turner, Mens Rea and Motorists, (1936) 5 Camb. L. J. 61.
Defense counsel find the instruction very useful: Wild and Curtis-Ben-
nett, King's Counsel, (1938) 253.122aImmediate scientific investigation of the facts in cases of auto-
mobile collisions is of fundamental importance in the proper administration
of criminal law in these cases. Such investigation is described in the pub-
lications of the National Safety Council, of the Travelers Insurance Com-
pany, and of the Traffic Safety Institute of Northwestern University and
the International Association of Chiefs of Police. See especially the Insti-
tute's publication, Accident Prevention Bureaus in Municipal Police De-
partments (1937).
12See notes 70 to 73, inclusive, supra.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
fully successful." 4 To begin with, the name given to the new
offense includes the word "negligent," the term which is used with
such ambiguity and confusion in the involuntary manslaughter
definitions and cases. The new offense, moreover, usually is not
related with sufficient definiteness in the definition to other criminal
offenses of the particular jurisdiction. As a result questions arise
about overlapping, gaps and omissions, in relation to other statutes.
There are uncertainties also with regard to repeals of previous
legislation by implication Finally, minimum penalties have not
been sufficiently reduced.""
The negligent homicide statutes are no doubt a valuable devel-
opment in this field of the law, and are doing good service in
various jurisdictions. As other jurisdictions, however, proceed
to enact similar legislation, the following proposals would seem
to be in point. It seems that a statute would be desirable which
would, in one section, penalize as a misdemeanor, the "driving of
a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the life and safety of
others," and in a further section provide that if any person drives
a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the life and safety of
others and thereby causes the death of -another person, he will be
guilty of the offense of "homicide by dangerous driving." The
degree of the dangerousness required for guilt would be, as under
the present law, a question of fact for the jury, depending upon
the circumstances of each case. Another section might provide
that cases of homicide with full intent be excluded from the appli-
cation of the statute. The penalty clauses should cover a consider-
able range, with moderate minimums of fine and of imprisonment,
and with provisions for cumulative sentences in cases of multiple
deaths or of other aggravated circumstances. Past and present
experience shows that a conviction, with a sentence of even a
month in jail in an appropriate case, is far better for the public
interest than is an acquittal due to the refusal of the jury to
inflict a penalty of imprisonment which is fixed by law at a
minimum of one year; or, as in some statutes, the term may be
one of eight or ten years.
General experience in involuntary manslaughter cases indi-
cates, furthermore, that it should be made possible in appropriate
cases, for a jury to bring in a verdict, or in case of trial by the
court, for the court to make a finding, of guilt or acquittal of
ls 4Reisenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A Study in Statutory Interpre-
tation, (1936) 25 Cal. L. Rev. 1.
125 The English statute provides much lower penalties than the average
American statute. 20 & 21 Geo. V (1930) ch. 43.
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either the homicide by dangerous driving or the misdemeanor of
dangerous driving, or of both. Statutory provision for such proce-
dure, if necessary in the particular jurisdiction, would provide
for it by joinder of counts, or by consolidation of indictments, and
would provide further that guilt or acquittal upon one charge would
have no bearing in point of law upon the other charge.20
A modernizing of the statutory definitions of involuntary man-
slaughter is seen to be desirable for most, if not all, of the
American and English jurisdictions. Probably, however, such
modernization should be undertaken in each jurisdiction only as
part of a systematic, coherent and non-artificial codification of the
law of criminal homicide. Pending such codification, neverthe-
less, the prevailing cheap regard for human life as evidenced by
the great number of preventable and inexcusable fatal "accidents,"
calls for the enactment of special statutes to provide simply and
directly for criminal homicides committed by dangerous acts and
omissions in modern traffic and industry.
Prevention of killings in automobile traffic can be promoted
in part by the modernization of the law of involuntary man-
slaughter. The contributions of education and the services of
engineering in traffic safety are indeed important. It is neverthe-
less true that the whole process of saving lives in traffic, and in
industry as well, rests fundamentally upon the law. In order to
meet this responsibility today the successful administration of
the law in the courts requires provisions of law which are dear,
concise and fully capable of commanding respect.t
126Criticisms to the effect that a similar statutory provision permits
illogical and therefore undesirable and perhaps unlawful results, are rejected
by Judge Macnaghten in Rex v. Onyett, (1937) The Assizes, 1 Jour.
Crim. Law 60.
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